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The week of 3-7 May 2021 was Brazil’s National Week of Communications, “[...] an entire week
of announcements, deliveries and ‘spoilers’ of how the [Brazil’s] future will be with new
technologies”1. The highlight of the event was 5 May, Digital Day, which held demonstrations of
different uses of 5G technology. Digital Day was hosted at the National Congress in Brazil’s
capital, and had President Jair Bolsonaro speaking at the opening ceremony, early in the
morning. Instead of talking about 5G technology, Bolsonaro talked about Covid-19:
It is a new virus, no one knows if it was born in a laboratory or through some human
being [who] ingested an inappropriate animal. But it is there. The military knows what
chemical, bacteriologic and radiologic war is. Could it be that we are facing a new war?
What country grew its GDP the most? I am not going to tell you.2 (my translation)
China is the world’s leading country in 5G technology. It has also been Brazil’s number one
trading partner since 2009, top investor since 2019, and main supplier of active pharmaceutical
ingredients for the Covid-19 vaccines being produced in the country. And yet, Bolsonaro chose
“to meme” China, disregarding the negative consequences this could have — for the economy
and for the management of the pandemic. Similar statements have been frequent, coming from
other members of government (including three ministers), and are never unauthorized by the
President, who escalated the problem by insinuating that China may have created the coronavirus
in a lab (a theory already debunked by the WHO3), and could be engaging in a biological war,
against Brazil in particular and/or the world as a whole. Furthermore, the President has expressed





that claims that Covid-19 happened because someone in China ate an “[...] inappropriate animal
[...]” (to see how the “bat soup” narrative quickly spread in Brazil, through clusters of
pro-Bolsonaro influencers on social media, see Malini et al. 2020). Narratives like that are not
random, they serve a purpose, they are strategic.
In Bolsonarism, the perception of an imminent threat, the fear of a permanent enemy and
the logic of conflict are embedded in its meaning-making process (Rocha 2021). The
Bolsonarist’s main narrative is based on a conspiracy that “[...] an international communist plot
to destroy the nation [...]” is occuring, which, in turn, has been strategically used throughout the
20th century in Brazilian politics. According to Rodrigo Patto Sá Motta, a historian and the
author of On Guard Against the Red Menace: Anti-Communism in Brazil, 1917-1964, “[...] the
red menace is the most powerful threat used to scare Brazilians—both in the past and today [...]
Without a doubt, conspiracy theories have helped authoritarians, time and time again, in Brazil
[...]” (Motta 2020)4.
Bolsonarism, as one of the most refined examples of digital populism, not only did it
form, articulate and thrive in social media, but it also relies heavily on the business model of
Social Network Sites (SNS), which is based on user-generated content (Cesarino 2020a). This
thesis focuses on one specific form of user-generated content, namely internet memes, which
have played an important role in Brazilian politics for a while now, and are an established part of
Brazilian political communication. The 2014 presidential election is considered the “election of
memes” by Brazilian journalists (Chagas et al. 2017), while the 2018 election, the one Bolsonaro
won, is considered the “fake news election” (Jardelino et al. 2020). Eduardo Bolsonaro, son of
the president and until recently President of the Congressional Committee on Foreign Affairs and
National Defense (January 2019 - March 2021), tells people in the Right not to engage in online
discussions with the Left. Instead, they should do as he does: make memes5. On this point, the
Bolsonarist base has not been shy in answering that call, with some of their creations making it
all the way to the President’s social media accounts, adding to the list of several internet memes
that he publishes himself. These memes are not random either, they are packed with political







distracting the public, but they can also be employed to cultivate a strong sense of identity and
belonging (Phillips & Milner 2017). Taken altogether, these dynamics point to the need for a
further investigation into the use of internet memes as magnifiers in the projection of strategic
narratives.
The objective of this thesis is to study how internet memes can be used as a medium to
project strategic narratives—particularly when the audiences of a narrative embed it into memes
(consciously or not), projecting it even further; a question which has sparked debate in academia
and society at large. Academically, on one hand, there is a pressing need to research and
understand how narratives are projected visually (Crilley 2015). On the other, there are other
analyses of Bolsonarist internet memes as political communication in Brazil (Nigro et al. 2019;
Milanezi 2019; Chagas & Magalhães 2020), and one considers memes depicting Bolsonaro as
different archetypes and reflecting political events within the country (Chagas 2020), but no
research has been done with internet memes related to Bolsonaro’s foreign policy. As such, this
thesis is a modest contribution which is intended to to fill both of these gaps. Finally, the social
relevance of this thesis joins the attention to memes as triggers of anger (Stevens 2021) and
memes as a genre for conspiracy theorizing online (Varis 2019). Particular to the Brazilian
context, it recognizes the established role of internet memes in Brazilian politics, as a guarantor
of access to debate (Chagas 2019a), but also adds to a recent study connecting memes to the
growing anti-China sentiment in Brazil, that is being reflected in different spheres of the society6.
To give some examples, Brazilian senators have expressed serious concern about attacks against
China on pro-Bolsonaro social media7, representatives of agribusiness are worried about the
antagonistic approach taken by Bolsonaro’s government towards China8, and representatives of
bilateral trade have expressed that Bolsonaro’s negative comments about China are an obstacle to









6 There are no opinion polls of Brazilians’ opinions about China, differently from about the United States,
for example. The Latin American Opinion Project (LAPOP) measures that (and many other issues) yearly,
since 2006. https://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/
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rejection of Chinese vaccines may shed some light on an alarming trend: rejection is much
higher among those who consider Bolsonaro’s government good or great.
In order to understand the Bolsonarist meaning-making process behind its strategic
narratives about China, and how these are reflected in internet memes, this thesis is guided by
two research questions:
1. What are the Bolsonarist strategic narratives about China?
2. How are Bolsonarist strategic narratives about China expressed in internet
memes?
To answer them, this thesis draws on a theoretical framework that combines semiotics of culture
(mainly from Tartu-Moscow School—TMS), strategic narrative theory, strategic conspiracy
narratives, and digital populism in order to perform a two-step analysis. Below is a roadmap of
how this thesis is structured.
The first chapter, Historiography, presents a literature review of previous works on
similar topics. The focus here is on studies showing different ways in which internet memes have
been used for political communication, with a special attention to those that are grounded in
semiotics. I then highlight which findings from the mentioned works this thesis develops, as well
as where it differs from them.
Chapter two, Theoretical and Conceptual Framework, lays out the theory used and the
concepts this thesis is built on, as I use the example (and give the context) of Bolsonarism. The
chapter is divided into three sections: 2.1. covers Semiotics of Culture as understood by
Tartu-Moscow School. The next subchapter, 2.2. Bolsonarism as an Example of Digital
Populism, describes some elements of socialization through social media that is notable in
Bolsonarism. Then, subchapter 2.3. delineates the main elements and communicative processes
of strategic narratives; hence the title, Strategic Narratives. Following is subchapter 2.4,
Strategic Conspiracy Narratives, which focuses on particular meaning-making strategies behind
strategic conspiracy narratives. Methodology (subchapter 2.5) is the last section of Chapter 2. It
describes the chosen empirical material: 1) four texts (one academic article, Bolsonaro’s
inauguration speech and two blog posts) by Mr. Ernesto Araújo, who served as Brazilian
Minister of foreign affairs during the first half of Bolsonaro’s mandate as president; and 2) 78
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anti-China internet memes, which, after narrowing them down through different categories of
analysis, resulted in a selection of eight. The analysis of this empirical material 1) is done
through using both strategic narrative theory and the framework of strategic conspiracy
narratives; while the data set 2) is analysed, through multimodal discourse analysis, using the
framework of strategic conspiracy theories.
The third chapter is a brief account of how the Bolsonarist organized digital militia
(known in Brazil as the “Cabinet of Hate”) was mobilized during Brazil’s first diplomatic crisis
with China.
Finally, the fourth and last chapter is dedicated to the analysis, and is also divided into
two parts. The first one is dedicated to Bolsonarist strategic narratives. The second step is an
analysis of anti-China internet memes, where I look for the strategic narratives found in the first
analysis. By drawing on a framework of digital populism, I elaborate on how strategic narratives
can be packed into and unpacked from internet memes.
Before clarifying the concepts and theory that will be used in this thesis, it is necessary to
review the previous works on memes as a form of political communication.
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2. HISTORIOGRAPHY
In this chapter I offer a brief overview of previous studies of memes in the fields of linguistics,
narratology, political communication, media studies and semiotics, with a special focus on the
latter as well as Brazilian works on the subject.
Internet memes as political communication have been an object of study for the last two
decades. One of the first works (Levinger & Lytle 2001) focuses on some widely shared
rhetorical patterns used by many nationalist movements to mobilize their supporters: commonly
used is the triadic narrative pattern, combining idealized images of the past with exaggerated
representations of a decaying present and a harmonious and utopian future. In short, before the
Left; a glorious past, the present threatened by the Left, and a future that may still be saved from
the Left. For example, Finnish nationalism and multiculturalism are examined by Pettersson and
Sakki (2017) using this triad.
Internet memes can also be employed to propagate ideologies and political arguments
(Knobel & Lankshear 2007, Yoon 2016). Other studies have treated them as speech acts
(Grundlingh 2018), as visual rhetoric (Huntington 2013), as a visual form of hate rhetoric
(Hakoköngäs et al. 2018), and as a tool to make political communication viral (Bebić &
Volarevic 2018).
Social movements also make use of memes in their communication. The Occupy Wall
Street movement provided the empirical material for three academic works, which approached
memes as participatory media / polyvocal public discourse (Milner 2013), as visual political
rhetoric (Huntington 2016), and as neutralizers of political dissent (Hristova 2019). Moreover,
the anonymity of memes and the fact that the responsibility for monitoring social media
communication is partly conducted by other users has provided the far-right and other extreme
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groups with new opportunities and platforms to disseminate their messages (Hatakka, 2020).
More recently, new works have appeared showing how memes are used in information warfare
(Greidina 2017; Ascott 2020; Dupuis & Williams 2020).
Gal’s (2019) work shows how multimodal messages are used, in Israel, as “boundary
objects”, to produce a sense of communion and segregation. Her work brings up the role of
ironic humor in online communication as a way to empower the in-group and marginalize
out-groups. As such, memes are employed to delegitimize dominant practices as well as to
legitimize the practices of group members. They make an accessible political tool, as they offer,
potentially, a way to reach wide audiences with minimal resources. Moreover, because they
spread through networks of users, they can be disseminated without restrictive control. Hence
“[...] internet memes are tools to crystallize an argument in an easily shareable, concise, and
often visual form (ibid.: 2).
From a semiotic perspective, we find Yopak’s (2018) analysis of memes as a
post-political communication form, and Kearney’s (2019) Peircean framework of memes as
participatory culture. In her “Semiotics of Spreadability”, Marino (2015) understands memes as
spreadable texts. Cannizzaro (2016) draws an approach anchored in the Tartu-Moscow School of
Semiotics of Culture. As such, she understands memes not as units but as relational, they are
elements of a constitutive system. This thesis follows Cannizaro’s understanding of memes as
“[...] a system of signs with the tendency to take translational habits (ibid: 576). Habit here
comes from the Peircean concept of habituescence: a process of education and learning that goes
far beyond the boundaries of education institutions and beyond conscious learning process,
manifested in online culture and subconscious adoption of attitude and disposition (ibid: 582).
Another approach that this thesis takes into consideration is that of internet memes as
partial stories of political narratives (de Saint Laurent et al. 2021), although this work is
grounded in narratology and character theory, which is not the focus of this thesis, but its
application could be fruitful.
Finally, there is a good number of works on memes done by Brazilian researchers, some
on internet memes as political communication in Brazil (Milanezi 2019, de Barros et al. 2019,
Chagas 2018). For instance, Chagas et al. (2017) developed a taxonomy for the analysis of
content of political internet memes that is a major reference for research in Brazil. Lívia Maia
Brasil (2017) shows how discourses projected on memes contribute to shaping the representation
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of political participation in young voters. One specific work, by Viktor Chagas (2020), analyses
internet memes depicting Bolsonaro as different archetypes and reflecting political events in
Brazil (Chagas 2021).
This present thesis differs from previous works in a few aspects. For starters, the present
work is one of the few works that look at memes as carriers of narratives, particularly strategic
(conspiracy) narratives. It uses a framework anchored in the semiotics of culture, with a focus on
the Tartu-Moscow School. Finally, it is not a work focused solely on internet memes, but it looks
at them through the lenses of the Model Reader / Model Author (Eco 2005), in a groundbreaking
framework conceptualized by Madisson & Ventsel (2020)— to aid in understanding the
meaning-making strategies behind conspiracy theories. With the framework presented here, it is
possible to see memes as tellers of much longer stories.
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3. THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL
FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY
In this section I describe the concepts used in this work. Cesarino’s concepts of Bolsosphere and
Science of Populism are grounded in cultural anthropology (Douglas, cybernetics (Bateson), and
political philosophy (Laclau, Mouffe) while Madisson and Ventsel’s framework of Strategic
Conspiracy Narrative draws on strategic narrative theory (as developed by Miskimmon et al.
2014) and semiotics of culture (mainly by Umberto Eco, Juri Lotman and Boris Uspenski), and
reflecting the tradition of Tartu-Moscow school.
3.1 Semiotics of Culture as understood by Tartu-Moscow School
In this chapter I apply semiotics of culture, mainly through Juri Lotman and his co-author Boris
Uspensky, to show how a peripheral spreader (Olavo de Carvalho) translated elements of the
American alt-right and became the core of Bolsonarism. By looking at Bolsonarist media
ecology through the model of the semiosphere, I show how Olavo de Carvalho still structures
and organizes the projection of Bolsonarist narratives around him.
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3.1.1 Semiosphere
The semiosphere is a space where semiotic processes take place. The concept of space here can
be better understood through the forces driving the process of the semiosphere: boundaries,
peripheries, and the core, which will be discussed in further detail later. This spatial reference
also applies when we remember that we can conceptualize and manipulate “reality” through sign
systems, and that this varies depending on which semiosphere we are immersed in. This is
because there are several semiospheres, each one “[...] with the potential of self-organization,
self-description, and self-regulation, in constant exchange with other semiospheres, in a
permanent process of self-transformation resulting in an ongoing growth of signs and culture
[...]” (Nöth 2014: 15).
That constant exchange happens at the boundary, which not only delimits where one
semiosphere ends and another starts, but instead of being a solid frontier, it resembles more of a
membrane that acts like a filter, decoding, exchanging and translating information that was coded
in another semiosphere, in a process of separation and union.
Boundary as a mechanism of translation of texts belonging to an alien semiotics into the
language of ‘ours,’ a site of transforming the ‘external’ into ‘internal’; it is a filtering
membrane that transforms others’ texts to the extent allowing their inscription into… the
semiosphere. (Lotman 2005: 211)
The semiosphere is a system that owes its dynamism to the centripetal force, where the elements
in the periphery try to penetrate the center, while those in the core resist them, i.e., centrifugal
forces. Schönle and Shine (2006) argue that, in Lotman’s theory, culture is essentially both the
hegemonic unity and decentredness of power, “[...] for it evidences both centrifugal and
centripetal forces, which play themselves out on various, coexisting layers [...].”  (ibid: 24).
The semiosphere model is ideal to explain Bolsonarism for a few reasons. First, it works
a lot better than concepts such as “bubbles” or “echo chambers”, as it shows that people here are
immersed in phenomenon that are not closed or isolated from external influence. It allows us to
see how new meanings are generated once alien concepts are translated. The innovation of my
model is that it shows how the origins of Bolsonarism can also be found in America, more
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specifically in the American alt-right. Last but not least, the Bolsonarist semiosphere maps out
the key spreaders (translators) that organize the meaning-making processes and practices among
Bolsonaro supporters.
The most important of these key spreaders is Olavo de Carvalho, a peripheral figure in
Brazilian journalistic circles due to his staunch anti-communist and conspiratorial writings. He
moved to the United States after Lula, from the Workers Party, won the 2002 presidential
elections. There he was in contact with a peripheral political discourse in American politics—the
alt-right. Soon he would incorporate alt-right ideas and methods into his teaching, making heavy
use of social media, applying and promoting trolling techniques and translating conspiracy
theories from the USA to Brazil. This boundary work started generating new meanings for
Brazilians audiences and the Olavist package (conspiratorial thinking, binary modelling of the
world and a hostile approach towards the other) began shaping the culture of a emerging New
Brazilian Right, which is carried out by the most radicals among the Bolsonarists—the president
and his sons included.
3.1.2 Boundary and the other
As mentioned in the subchapter “Semiosphere”, the boundary has a key role in generating new
meaning. The boundary is the most important functional and structural position of semiotic space
that determines the nature of its meaning mechanism, as it translating external messages into an
internal language and vice versa (Lotman 2005: 208-2009). Functioning as generators, organizers
and carriers of meanings, boundaries are also attributes of power (Schöpflin 2010, 65).
Since one of the primary mechanisms of semiotic individuation is the boundary, “our
side” tends to be characterized as “ours,” “my own,” “cultured,” and “safe,” while “their space”
is “other,” “hostile,” “dangerous,” “chaotic” (Lotman 1990, 131). Binary thinking does not
consider the relative equality of the concerned parties, which in turn does not lead even to the
mere acknowledgment and right of the opponent’s existence (Lotman 2007, 26, cited in
Madisson & Ventsel 2016: 333). Madisson and Ventsel (2020: 11-13) explain how, from the
perspective of semiotics, conflict is determined through the boundary or translation mechanism.
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3.1.3 Self-Description: who is “we”, who is “they” among Bolsonarists
The need for self-description is considered as “[t]he most universal feature of human cultures
[...]” (Salupere, Torop 2013: 25). My application of the semiosphere to the model of this thesis
considers the central role that self-description has in, in, articulating and establishing the
boundaries of semiotic units (Madisson 2016), the element that organizes and regulates,
hierchally, the core of the Bolsonarist semiosphere, and, consequently, its boundary.
In Lotman’s words, “[...] the system, passing through the stage of self-description,
undergoes changes: assigning to itself clear boundaries and a considerably higher degree of
unification. [...] The self-description of culture makes a boundary of the fact of its
self-consciousness” (Lotman 2009: 172). Many authors consider that the anti-Workers Party
sentiment was an aggregator that brought together different collectives forming the “new
Brazilian right” (Telles 2015, Messenberg 2017), which would result in the election of Bolsonaro
(Parzianello 2019). By making the Workers Party the other, the “we” was shaped, as the success
of the political discourse happens when the deconstruction of the other is set [in motion] and in
the way that it constructs itself, which acts as the opposition to the other (Parzianello 2019).
Self-description is related to the need of culture to create a model of itself (and for itself)
in order to organize itself hierarchically, by canonizing some texts and eliminating the others
(Lotman 2020: 94.). Using the semiosphere model, we find self-descriptions being developed in
core structures, where meta-descriptions are used to describe themselves and the periphery
(Lotman 2005: 213). Bolsonaro finished his speech at the 75th UN’s General Assembly with a
statement: “Brazil is a Christian and conservative country, and has the family at its base [...]11”,
showing that the 13% of Brazilians who do not identify themselves as Christians are excluded
from the Bolsonarist semiosphere.
In terms of semiotics of culture, meta-structural self-descriptors, such as grammars,
enhance “[...] the rigidity of the structure and slow down its development” (Lotman 2005: 214).





identification and elimination of differences (Lotman 1988: 35), which is manifested while this
ideal unity is constantly challenged by the periphery, constituting the roots of cultural dynamics
(Lotman 2005: 213).
Albeit conceptualized with cultural identification in mind, the concept of self-description
is a fertile one for analysing identity creation, as it sets the boundaries, centralizes the core
descriptors and hierarchically defines the structure of the semiosphere. According to Monticelli
(2012: 66), self-description offers a general theoretical characterization of socio-cultural
separation, closing and excluding operations. Many Twitter profiles of Bolsonaro supporters
commonly show “about me” (self-descriptions) such as “Brazilian, patriot, conservative,
capitalist [...]”, others are complemented with “[...] ‘anti-communist’, ‘non-politically correct’,
and/or ‘against abortion’”.
Lotman and Uspenski went further to develop a typology of how cultures describe
themselves: either mainly towards content (as a system of grammars), or largely towards
expression (as a collection of established texts or habits) (Lotman, Uspenski 1978: 217, Lotman,
Uspenski 1978: 217). The first type, called eccentric culture, acknowledges itself as a system of
rules and uses “organized-unorganized” as its basic structural opposition. It is a culture that is
open to external contacts (Monticelli 2008: 281, cited in Madisson 2016: 208) and
communication , thanks to its gradual boundary between inner and outer structures, which speed
up cultural processes and facilitates the renewal and transformation of existing forms (Monticelli
2008: 281, cited in Madisson 2016:208). The second type is called concentric culture, and since
Bolsonarism can be expressed as an example of this culture, it deserves its own subchapter.
3.1.4 Concentric culture: Bolsonarism as a culture focused on expression
The second type, called concentric culture, acknowledges itself as a collection of established
texts. It uses “correct-incorrect” as its basic structural opposition, where incorrect is understood
as wrong, bringing it close and even overlapping with the opposition “true-false”. Here culture is
not the opposition of chaos (entropy), but preceded by a negative sign—anticulture (Lotman,
Uspenski 1978: 217). The Bolsonarist self-description calls out for an established code texts that
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existed before Bolsonaro: “An international communist plot to destroy the nation”. This
conspiracy theory, which can be traced back to the 1920s, has surfaced in times of political crisis,
contributing to the three political shifts in Brazilian history.
The boundary between inner and outer structures for this kind of culture is hard and fast.
“In other words, anticulture is constructed here isomorphically to culture, in its own image: it too
is understood as a sign system having its own expression. One can say that anticulture is
perceived as culture with a negative sign, as a mirror image of culture (where the ties are not
broken but are replaced by their opposites) (Lotman, Uspenski 1978: 217). This binary logic
interprets significant cultural changes as signs of the beginning era of prosperity or disaster. The
Bolsonarist semiosphere is an example of concentric culture. It presents itself as a mirror image
of elements associated with the Left (“the Communist”) in general, or the Workers Party (Partido
dos Trabalhadores - PT) or in particular. For Bolsonarists, PT “destroyed Brazil”, Bolsonaro
brought upon a new era, and now he needs to stand his ground before Brazil succumbs to China’s
plan to control a decaying West.
This type of culture expresses its self-description alongside an idea of complete and
unconditional destruction of existing developments and the apocalyptic generation of the new,
even when empirical studies reveal multiple and gradual processes (Lotman 2009: 173).
Bolsonaro declared “I always dreamed of liberating Brazil from the nefarious ideology of the left
[...] We have to deconstruct many things, undo many things, before starting to do others. I am
happy to be the turning point12”.
Self-descriptions with this tendency move towards closing the culture and separating it
from the outer space (beyond the boundary), which is perceived as hostile, a threat. Lotman has
pointed out that binary thinking does not even consider the relative equality of the concerned
parties. Even if acknowledging such equality may not mean admitting the opponent’s right to the
truth, it would at least mean admitting its right to existence (Lotman 2007: 26). During the
election campaign, and already as president, Bolsonaro vowed to “eliminate the Left” several
times, calling it “parasites”, “cancer”, etc. The semiotic systems that rely on this model are
primarily oriented towards autocommunication (Lepik 2007: 78). This is evident in the constant
mobilization of Bolsonarists, who are encouraged to block and ignore the leftists, who represent
in whatever form the imminent threat posed by the “communists”.
12 https://www.france24.com/en/20191221-bolsonaro-a-year-of-anti-establishment-uproar-in-brazil
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3.2 Bolsonarism as an Example of Digital Populism
Considering Bolsonarism as a concentric culture with a strong online presence, the next
subchapters will draw on some of its main characteristics. For the purposes of this thesis, I
borrow two concepts from Brazilian anthropologist Letícia Cesarino, who has been doing online
ethnography in Bolsonarist WhatsApp groups since 2018. Then, to understand the logic that
unites media outlets, politicians and voters, concepts like propaganda feedback loop and
conspiracy cascades will be introduced.
3.2.1 Bolsosphere and the “Cabinet of Hate”
Bolsoesfera (Bolsosphere), coined by Cesarino (2019) to explain the patterns that rule the digital
universe of Bolsonaro’s campaign, particularly on WhatsApp13. According to her, the structure of
the “Bolsosphere” consists of four layers: the first layer already existed and had a digital
mobilization before the 2018 election campaign (Bolsonaro’s second son, Carlos, has been
credited as one of the key strategists at the top of the pyramid). The second layer is ex officio and
is formed by the support networks on WhatsApp with content shared unilaterally by the
administrators, serving as a daily source of new content and as an immediate answer to the
events happening both online and offline. The next layer is the big (often public) groups with
256 members (the limit imposed by the platform), who share information (often distorted or
fake) with other groups and coordinate digital and street actions. The last layer is made of
personal groups, safe spaces of communication, and mobilization related to the campaign. Her
analysis of this media ecosystem indicates that everything that was circulated on Facebook and
13 It is important to point out that she noticed this structure before it came public that in fact there is a
structured hierarchy creating content and coordinating WhatsApp groups, commonly known in Brazil as




Twitter appeared first on WhatsApp. This “Bolsosphere” skillfully attracted sympathizers willing
to spontaneously replicate the content from the candidate. Many of these sympathizers were
already immersed in these networks that have been articulated long before the political
campaign, and many others remained after the elections. Later on, through investigations on the
dissemination of fake news (one in Parliament and one in the Supreme Court), and confirmed by
a report by Facebook, we learned that the Bolsosphere continues to operate under the staff of
Bolsonaro and his sons. In Brazil it is widely known as the “Cabinet of Hate”, a central
coordination with Carlos and Eduardo Bolsonaro at the top.14 Their (des)information campaigns
are often followed by the “digital militias”, a group of key spreaders / digital influencers / media
pundits. In Chapter 3, I provide an example of how they operate.
3.2.2 Main characteristics of Bolsonaro’s digital populism
Cesarino (2019a) draws her research from a qualitative, online ethnographic point of view, and
describes what she calls “science of populism”, which is based on five rules that guided the
content production in pro-Bolsonaro online networks during the 2018 election
campaign—which, this thesis claims, still apply to Bolsonarist internet meme creation.
She points out the main metalinguistic axis that make up the Bolsonarist memetic
patterns, which reflect what Laclau (2005) called the axis of difference (drawing an antagonistic
division between friend and enemy) and the axis of equivalence (drawing a contiguity between
leader and “people”) (Cesarino 2019a). She concluded that the online content (short texts,
internet memes, images, etc.), circulating throughout the Bolsosphere, operated as a “[...]
complexity reduction mechanism, drawing a rigid inside-outside group frontier; they recurred at
multiple scales; and they were efficacious in producing and stabilizing the ‘people’ through a
double, syntagmatic (we-them opposition) and paradigmatic (leader-people) axis” (Cesarino
2019a: 3).
Besides the two discursive functions above, she identified three others, which make up
for the “five rules” listed below. From the massive universe of digital content circulating in
14 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-facebook-disinformation-brazil-idUSKBN2492Y5
24
pro-Bolsonaro WhatsApp groups, all of the material there could be classified in terms of one or
more of the following five basic functions:
1. Create a binary exclusive division: friend versus enemy, “we” versus “them”;
2. Produce a “we”, a continuity between charismatic leadership and “people”;
3. Establish an atmosphere of constant threat connected to the enemy, through conspiratory
or alarmistic messages (hence maintaining the mobilization);
4. Show an inverted mirror of the enemy and turn the opponents’ accusations around;
5. Create a direct and exclusive channel of communication between leadership and its
public, through the delegitimization of instances of production of authorized knowledge
in the public sphere such as the press and academia.
The author points out how these patterns systematically structured discourse at the
meta-communicative level of form rather than content. She borrows the concept of
deutero-learning (Bateson 1972) to claim that such discursive patterns are intuitively reproduced
by those inside these groups, as they “[...] become part of users’ very cognitive framing and
political subjectivities - how they literally come to see the world, and act upon it” (Cesarino
2019a: 3). Another important element in this online content creation is the demarcation of a
dangerous outside, to borrow the concept from Mary Douglas (1966) of group formation and
symbolic classification along a pure-impure axis15, which can be found in the mobilization of
affect-loaded images and evocations shared throughout these online groups.
3.2.3 Propaganda Feedback Loop and Conspiracy Cascades
Benkler et al. (2018) describe the phenomenon of propaganda feedback loop in the United States,
but it could perfectly be applied to the (recent) Bolsonarist media outlets16, some of them formed
16 In the U.S. Trump has FOX as a media ally, Bolsonaro has RECORD, owned by Evangelical Bishop
Edir Macedo. The American case shows different radio hosts, conspiracy theorists and conservative
15 Dirty-clean; repugnant-virtuous; corrupt-righteous; good-evil, to name a few. This is one of the most
common features in the Bolsonarist discourse. This will be evident with the analysis of the internet
memes.
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during the campaign, most of which now receive the biggest chunk of funds for government ads:
they emphasize partisan-confirming news over truth, thus reducing the discomfort of segments of
the public by telling them not to trust the outlets that provide disconfirming news. Those who
seek confirmation more than truth will reward this outlet with attention (which in the case of
social media is necessary to sell its ads). As some politicians want the votes of those audiences,
they end up seeking those outlets. Now the members of the public have media outlets and
politicians confirming their prior beliefs and telling them that the media that contradicts what is
said and believed are themselves biased and hence untrustworthy. The result is that those who
buy into this reduce their levels of trust in other media. These audiences develop confidence that
the partisan good news they hear is true, and that the conflicting news from other outlets is false,
thus reducing the psychological cost of consuming only the bias-confirming outlets. A politician
who wants to succeed in such a media ecosystem will align his/her positions and narratives with
publics who are like-minded and media sources that are supportive, or will adapt the narrative
towards what the public and media would want to follow.
What is formed from this process is a joint negotiation—by (political) elites, partisan
media, pundits, and political activists—of partisan talking points, interpretations of real-world
events, and ideological positions. At this point these news media do not distinguish news from
opinion, and “[...] compete by policing each other for deviance from identity confirmation, not
truth” (ibid: 78). These media outlets adjust their coverage of politicians to offer a favorable
view of the identity-confirming ones, while those who deviate from identity confirmation, not
truth, receive attacks. The result is a “[...] steady flow of identity-confirming news” (ibid) to
audiences who consume these media outlets precisely for that, and who no longer believe the
external “lying” media. Incumbent politicians cannot fully rely on the mainstream media to
challenge what a politician focused on, bias-confirming says. The same trade-offs between truth
and bias confirmation also apply to challengers within the party. The result of this dynamic is a
trade that benefits everyone: the audiences get the psychological reward of identity confirmation,
media outlets get their attention (which is translated into advertising revenue), and politicians get
the votes. The authors call this dynamic the “propaganda feedback loop”, because “ [...] once it is
set in motion the media, elites, and the public are all participants in a self-reinforcing feedback
youtubers supporting Trump since the election campaign, while very similar people in Brazil have filled
the ranks of Bolsonaro’s supporters.
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loop that disciplines those who try to step off it with lower attention or votes, and gradually over
time increases the costs to every one of introducing news that is not identity confirming, or
challenges the partisan narratives and frames” (ibid: 79).
By analyzing the results of opinion polls in the US, the authors claim that “[...]audiences
in this loop will exhibit high trust in identity-confirming media, and low trust in external media”
(ibid). The same can be seen in Brazil, where constant attacks towards Globo and Folha (Brazil’s
leading TV channel and newspaper, respectively) are spearheaded by Bolsonaro17, and reinforced
daily by his allies, voters, and followers. On the other hand, the second and third largest TV
channels, SBT and Record (the former declared support to the president and the latter helped the
candidate during the elections) are praised. Record is also known as the “channel of the
Evangelicals” as it is owned by neo-Petencostal bishop Edir Macedo. They were rewarded by the
Special Secretary of Social Communication, the agency that is responsible for the contracts of
publicity with the federal government, which in 2019 had a budget of R$ 150 million (€ 23,5
million, approximately). Globo’s share in federal contracts dropped from 39% to 16%, while
Record’s rose from 31% to 43%, and SBT’s from 30% to 41%18.
Bolsonarist online media has been receiving federal government funds through Google
Adsense, among them, the Jornal da Cidade Online, which has been sued and sentenced to pay
indemnisations for distorted and false news, and was also the most popular source of news
shared among right-wing (mainly Bolsonarist) WhatsApp groups during the 2018 elections
(Bursztyn & Birnbaum 2019). Another media outlet was Terça Livre, owned by the Bolsonarist
blogger Alan dos Santos, who is being investigated by the federal police and is currently a
fugitive in the United States. At one of the hearings of the Parliamentary Inquiry on Fake News,
Alan dos Santos denied ever received public funds, but in a period between 06/06/2019 and
13/07/2019 his youtube channel received 1447 ads with federal government publicity19. His







17 A leaked audio shows Bolsonaro reprimanding his minister of secretariat general, Gustavo Bebbiano,




Another approach to the idea of feedback loop is presented by Sustain & Vermeule
(2009) in their study of how conspiracy theories arise and spread. They expand the concept of
conspiracy cascades, by pointing out their four elements: information, reputation, availability and
emotions.
Conspiracy theories are accepted at first by people with low thresholds for its acceptance,
but as the informational pressure increases and more people begin accepting them, those with
higher thresholds start accepting them too. Reputation plays a role in which people who seek
being accepted as part of the group will “[...] squelch their own doubts in order to avoid social
sanctions” (ibid: 215). Once a particular event becomes available, “conspiracy theorists” will
show up to both explain it and use it as a part of a larger conspiracy narrative, attracting the
following of those who can fit this one event into the larger narrative they already subscribe to.
Finally, anger and fear make people more likely to focus on rumors and pass them along,
especially when those rumors trigger intense feelings, to the point of eventually generating an
“emotional snowballing”—an out of control selection of emotional content instead of
information (ibid: 216).
The authors also point out the phenomenon of group polarization linked to cascades:
people often end up in a more extreme position after going through cascades, which happens
particularly when “[...] people have a shared sense of identity and are connected by bonds of
solidarity” (ibid: 217). Finally—just like the Bolsonarist semiosphere shows—the combination
of cascades and polarization will move the group’s median view towards a direction that not
everyone will agree with, resulting in the departure of doubters and halfway-believers while the
intense believers dig their heels into the group’s narrative. As a result the group may shrink, but
the remaining members will display more fanaticism. It is not uncommon to witness members
practicing self-segregation, in terms of space or information, in an attempt to shield their beliefs
from the contestation by outsiders, or even to see group leaders calling for insulation by the
members of the group to avoid exposure to information or arguments that would challenge the
leader’s grip on the group.
There has been some criticism on the concepts of echo chamber and filter bubble, mainly
spearheaded by Axel Bruns (2019), who considers them an expression of technological/media
determinism. He proposes that “echo chambers” and “filter bubbles”, pointing that the former
represents patterns of connection while the later expresses practices of communication, and as
28
such both should have their use limited to social media contexts. Still, he claims that both “[...]
metaphors tend to misrepresent the connective and communicative patterns they describe as
symptomatic of users’ entire experience of social media platforms, rather than as only one aspect
of a much more diverse range of encounters” (2019: 7). In other words, people are not
completely isolated from contrary information and not entirely disconnected from people who
think differently. Bruns arguse that those metaphors attempt to make technology responsible for
societal problems: polarization is a social issue, not a technological one.
3.3 Strategic Narratives
Strategic narratives are “a means by which political actors attempt to construct a shared meaning
of the past, present, and future of international politics to shape the behaviour of domestic and
international actors” (Miskimmon et al. 2017: 6). I use this framework here because it structures
narratives in a way that we can see the strategy behind them. In the case of Bolsonarist narratives
about China, we can identity not only the elements that make them such, but, moreover, how
they drive audiences to act or behave according to their purpose.
A strategic narrative contains five components: 1) Character or actors (agent); 2) Setting /
environment / space (scene); 3) Conflict or action (act); 4) Tools / behaviour (agency); and 5)
Resolution / or suggested resolution / goal (purpose), however it is important to understand “the
relationship between them in a dynamic way rather than in rote categorization of component
parts” (Miskimmon et al. 2017: 7). This structure allows for an identification of actors and
actions and, while the explanation of the setting, action and goal recognizes the importance of
temporality: the past (history), the present (where “we” are now), and the future (where are “we”
going).
There are three types of strategic narratives: 1) international system narratives (describing
how the world is structured); 2) identity narrative (the story of a political actor, its values and
goals); and 3) policy narratives (why a policy is needed and how it will be accomplished).
Finally, there is the communicative process, how the strategic narrative is formed, projected and
received.
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Considering that strategic narratives are part of a communicative process, the concept
elaborated by Miskimmon et al. focuses on how they are formed, projected and received.
Formation describes how narratives are formed, the role of political actors in their construction
and through which institutions and procedures they are agreed upon. Projection conveys the
ways in which narratives are projected (or narrated) and contested, “particularly in a new media
environment” (ibid: 9). Finally, reception addresses how narratives are received, their reach (or
saturation); it “happens in social contexts where narratives may be discussed socially as well as
processed individually”.
3.4 Strategic Conspiracy Narratives
Madisson and Ventsel (2020) develop the concept of strategic narratives further by giving it a
semiotic approach and focusing on conspiracy theories. While grounded on the original theory
by Miskimmon et al., the authors frame the components of conspiracy theories as “[...]
antagonists, protagonists, concrete goals and activities making reaching those goals possible,
spatial and temporal relationships, etc.” (ibid: 4). They understand the central role of conflict in
conspiracy theories, and thus dedicate a semiotic approach to it, which is heavily grounded in the
culture semiotics from the tradition of the Tartu-Moscow school, with theory by Juri Lotman, as
well as Umberto Eco’s conception of the Model Reader and Model Author. Considering that
Bolsonaro’s foreign policy is based on a perceived conflict between traditionalism (“we”) and
globalism (“them”), anchored in the code text of the conspiracy theory of the communist threat, I
find it appropriate to use Madisson and Ventsel’s framework to this thesis, in particular regarding
the conflict as the topic and the meaning-making behind the modelling of Bolsonarist strategic
narratives about China.
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3.4.1 Model Reader & Model Author
For Madisson and Ventsel (2020), Umberto Eco’s (2005) concept of the Model Reader “[...]
allows the researcher to study which semiotic strategies have been used in constructing the
audiences targeted in the strategic conspiracy narratives, as well as the unity of the aims the
narrative pursues” (Madisson and Ventsel 2020: 4). Eco’s methodology also allows the analysis
of the self-image of the sender, i.e., the Model Author, which “[...] becomes particularly relevant
in cases when the author’s position has not been presented explicitly (e.g., deictically, using the
first person singular), but is revealed through mediated discourses (ibid: 26). In their model, both
the actual creator of narratives and the social media users who develop the narrative further—the
narrative magnifiers as they call them, or projectors in Miskimmon’s terms— and make up a
single Model Author, “[...]whose unity becomes apparent via detecting the aims that they seek to
meet” (ibid: 30).
In a model of author - text - recipient, a “(successful) communication presumes that the
communication partners have a common component in their memories” (ibid: 25). For Eco, the
recipient operates the interpretation of the text through semantic, syntactic, codes, by using
meanings previously known, and by linking different parts of the text and creating intertextual
links with other texts known to them. Thus the author consciously writes into the text “the
unsaid” with what is said, leaving for the reader the activity of reading that “unsaid” (Eco 2005,
57-58). The “unsaid” can be composed of what is taken for granted by the culture shared by
sender and receiver, but also tap into codes known only to a limited group who can unpack the
full meaning potential of the text, while those not familiar with the code only interpret parts of
the text. The message thus meets the sender’s desired aims when its interpretation is “part of its
generation mechanism: to generate a text means to trigger a strategy a component of which is
foreseeing the other party’s moves” (ibid: 61).
Although Madisson and Ventsel’s (2020) application of Eco’s Model Reader and Model
Author was for the “coding” and “decoding” of conspiracy theories, this thesis recognizes the
parallels with “packing” and “unpacking” strategic narratives in/from internet memes. For the
discursive strategies of the Model Reader to be actualized, the reader has to relate to a system of
codes, subcodes and other semiotic conditions, which include:
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- A basic dictionary that makes out the elementary semantic qualities of expressions, that
operate as minimal meaning postulates or implication rules (Eco 2005, 84, cited in
Madisson & Ventsel 2020: 27). In the context of this thesis, the importance lies in the
choice of words (and visual signs) that starts to direct the interpretation strategy.
- Rhetorical and stylistic hyper-encoding (Eco 2005: 85, cited in Madisson & Ventsel
2020: 27), allowing the reader to detect both figurative expressions and those with
specific stylistic connotation. With the target group in mind, the strategic narrative should
include references to its peculiarities in the use of the language (including slang,
metaphors, expressions), and its expectations related to how bold the speech is, how its
opponents are represented, etc.
- Inferences of ordinary scenarios that determine a certain framework of action for
participants in narrative (Eco 2005: 86, cited in Madisson & Ventsel 2020: 28). Framing
organizes elements of cognitive knowledge and representations of the “world” that allows
the realization of basic cognitive acts, such as the act of perception, linguistic
understanding and activities (van Dijk 1998).
- Inferences of intertextual scenarios, related to the reader’s previous reading experience
and familiarity with genres that the author of the text has to take into consideration when
constructing the Model Reader (Eco 2005, 88,cited in Madisson & Ventsel 2020: 28 ).
According to Madisson and Ventsel (2020: 28), “[...] exploiting the foundational plots
from the cultural memory in the formation of strategic narrative potentially increases the
latter’s success in finding recognition with audiences, particularly as concerns
communication on social media, and in including the audience in creating and
disseminating subnarratives that support the main narrative”.
- Ideological hypercoding, allowing for the narrative to shape the Model Reader’s
ideological eventuality that will consider the empirical reader’s ideological views (Eco
2005: 92, cited in Madisson & Ventsel 2020: 95).
In Eco’s model, the focus is not so much in the author’s real intention, but rather the intentions
expressed in the text. In Madisson and Ventsel’s model, real creators of a narrative and “narrative
magnifiers” (social media users developing the narrative further) make up a single Model
Author.
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3.4.2 Conflict as the topic
Central to Madisson and Ventsel’s (2020: 5) framework is the question of conflict construction
between the own and the alien, which they treat in the framework of cultural semiotics
(modelling the relations of culture-anti-culture, culture-non-culture) (Loman, Uspenskij 1978),
Laclau’s (2005) theory of hegemony, Mouffe’s (2005) notion of agonistic logic and Foucault’s
(1980) notion of subjugated knowledge: “From the perspective of meaning-making conflict
functions as the center - the topic - of the conspiracy narrative” (Madisson & Ventsel 2020: 52).
As it will be shown in the analysis of internet memes about China, the topic is not
necessarily explicit in the text, but it is rather created by the reader in their reception of the text,
thus guiding their path of interpretation. According to Eco (2005: 95, cited in Madisson &
Ventsel 2020: 52), one of the main functions of the topic is to delimit, or rather, discipline the
process of interpretation, but it also operates as a guide of smaller text parts and discursive
structures, which “[...] need to be actualised in the light of the hypothesis made regarding the
topic or the topics'' (ibid: 94, cited in Madisson & Ventsel 2020: 52). Madisson and Ventsel
(2020: 54-55) remind us that conspiracy narratives contain, besides a fundamental conflict, a
series of other conflicts—their subtopics—that are of more local importance. These subconflicts
reflect the socio-cultural background where they are articulated. Both levels of analysis in this
thesis will show that, whether it's China’s role in the globalist narrative, or how =internet memes
depict Bolsonaro’s political opponents, they are both depicted in relation to China.
3.4.3. Meaning-making on the basis of the code text of conspiracy theories
Another concept by Lotman (1988), the code text, is a textual system that has the collective
memory of a particular community in its origin. It functions as a specific meaning-making
template, or an interlink, a textual system with a rigid syntactic order. Its different signs can be
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split into various sub-structures, yet the code text remains unambiguous “[...] for itself”: from the
standpoint of its own level, the sign is something invested not only with a unity of expression but
also with a unity of content” (Lotman 1988b: 35; see Madisson 2014: 292; Madisson 2016a:
201). In their works, Madisson and Ventsel (see Madisson 2014; Madisson 2016b; Ventsel
2016a; Madisson & Ventsel 2020) have been developing a cultural semiotic model that explains
how code text is an invariant mechanism of meaning-making common to all conspiracy
narratives.
Conspiracy narratives possess a strong modelling capacity that makes it possible for them
to embrace events from different points and space, resulting in a synthetic whole with symbols
and sources that, at first sight, seem totally incompatible. By connecting strong meanings in a
way that can be easily perceived, they offer a shortcut, hence, apparently, “[...] why conspiracy
theories have become especially valued in these contemporary times of information overload”
(Madisson & Ventesel 2020: 43). They connect various tragic events, villains, through hiding and
secret plots. Yet, if intriguing hints pointing to a moment are woven into them, they can still
catch the attention of the interpreters, as they are already familiar with the components that are
repeated from one conspiracy theory to another. Events, signs and people can be newly woven
into the patchwork of the conspiracy theory, the whole that these can always be a part of. Hence,
two of the main characteristics of the model of meaning-making based on the code text of
conspiracy theories are:
- Discrete and non-discrete logic of code-textual meaning making. The sketching of
discrete meaning relations is always submitted to the non-discrete logic of signification
that is associative and based on analogies (Madisson & Ventsel 2020: 45). In other words,
the interpreter identifies signs of conspiracies when learning about a single event or new
piece of information, drawing parallels and creating connections;
- Binary modelling of the world, i.e., a tendency to divide it into agents of Good and Evil.
“As a rule, conspiracy theories sketch a conflict in which the opponent is perceived as
corrupt and immoral so that entering a dialogue or reaching a compromise with them is in
principle excluded” (ibid: 46)
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These concepts will guide the analysis of the meaning-making mechanisms behind the strategic
narrative of globalism, which draws from the code text of the “Red Menace” which has been
around in Brazil for the last 100 years.
3.5 Methodology
In this section I explain the methods of data collection and justify my selection of 1) statements
by government officials in charge of Brazil’s foreign policy, as well as 2) the internet memes
expressing anti-China views. I then proceed to elaborate the methodological approach, showing
the analytical tools applied to the collected data.
3.5.1. Data collection - Bolsonarist strategic narratives about China
To answer the first research question—What are the Bolsonarist strategic narratives about
China?—I applied strategic narrative theory, looking for agents, scenes, acts, agency and purpose
in four articles published by former Minister of Foreign Relations, Ernesto Araujo (mandate
02/01/2019 - 29/03/2021), as well as his inauguration speech. I selected these texts guided by the
principle that it is important to analyse his discourse over time, hence why there is one for each
year, since the 2017 publication that projected him into Bolsonarism, until the 2021 one where he
presents an overview of his mandate after stepping down, on 28/03/2021. The five texts are:
● “Trump and the West” (“Trump e o Ocidente”), article published (Araújo 2017), in
the Jornal of Foreign Policy (Cadernos de Política Exterior), a publication by the
foundation (FUNAG) subordinated to the Ministry of Foreign Relations. Several
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journalists and political analysts in Brazil consider this article to be Araujo’s
ticket to the Ministry20.
● “Transmission Line” (“Linha de Transmissão”), post (Araújo 2018) published on
his blog Metapolítics - Against Globalism21 (Metapolítica - Contra o Globalismo),
on 27/09/2018 (10 days before the first round of the 2018 elections). It is the
shortest of all his posts, but with many categories of analysis used in this thesis.
● Inauguration speech - Minister of Foreign Relations Ernesto Araújo (Araújo
2019), given on 02/01/2019, in Brasília.
● “The Communavirus has arrived” (“Chegou o Comunavírus”), post published by
Minister Ernesto Araújo (Araújo 2020) on his blog on 22/04/2020, where he
reviewed Slavoj Zizek’s book Pandemic!
● “An Itamaraty for Brazil’s freedom and greatness: management report” (“Um
Itamarty pela liberdade e grandeza do Brasil: balanço de gestão”) (Araújo 2021),
also published on his blog, on 10/04/2021, laying out his actions, perceptions and
motivations guiding his conduction of Brazil’s foreign policy.
The focus on this first analysis is on strategic narratives of 1) identity: the story, values and goals
of Brazil, and its relationship with China; as well as 2) systems: how the world is structured, how
the system works, who the players are, and what is Brazil’s place in it. Special attention is given
to the meaning-making mechanisms behind the crafting of these narratives (Model Author
behind the Formation) and how the audiences (Model Reader or Reception) interpret it,
connecting what is not said into the main narrative.
One important note to make is that, unless indicated otherwise, all quotations (originally
in Portuguese) extracted from the empirical material are translated by the author of this thesis.




The next step then is to look for the strategic narratives, resulting from the previous analysis, that
can be found in internet memes circulating in Brazil. In order to answer the second research
question—How are Bolsonarist strategic narratives about China reflected in internet memes?
—I collected a second set of data memes on China posted on three social media platforms
(Twitter, Facebook and Instagram) under five hashtags. My selection of hashtags included calls
to action (“say no to China”, “boycott China”, “trade block”), blatant hate (S.O.B) and
referencing China as a dictatorship, a common reference among Bolsonarists. Originally another
hashtag that was going to be used was #ChineseVirus (#VírusChinês), promoted by key
spreaders of Bolsonarism on Twitter during the first diplomatic crisis between Brazil in China,
triggered by Eduardo Bolsonaro’s tweet (this event is described in the subchapter Bolsosphere
against China. But some of these spreaders had their accounts suspended for promoting attacks
on the Supreme Court and the closing of the National Congress. I then decided to not include
#ChineseVirus as I intend to find memes that covered other aspects behind anti-China sentiment,
even without #ChineseVirus, a good number of the memes make reference to the pandemic. The
hashtags used were:
● #SayNotoChina (#DigaNãoàChina and all the the variants without the accents);
● #BoycottChina (#BoicoteaChina and #BoicoteàChina);




The result was 78 internet memes. I created a set of categories that tried to encompass all of the
ways in which China is visually and semantically represented in the analyzed memes. In order to
classify them and to narrow them down to a feasible number that can be analyzed thoroughly, I
classified them according to five categories, based on Cesarino’s (2019a) science of populism,
the propaganda feedback loop (Benkler et. al. 2018), strategic conspiracy narrative (Madisson &
Ventsel 2020) and Chagas’ (2021) analysis of how Bolsonaro is portrayed in internet memes.
The main focuses of analysis are: how many of these memes are created by those inside the
propaganda feedback loop (authorship); how China (actor) is represented through key signifiers
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(representation); how the conflict is constructed (act); attribution of agency to Brazilian elements
(used as tools / their behavior); and the usage of tropes, allowing the reader to connect China to
the image of something that has to be stopped or even eliminated (purpose).
The first category of analysis is non-excludent and refers to authorship. Considering that
China plays a role in the identity-confirmation of Bolsonarism, and that Brazilian memes are part
of political communication, it is expected that those in the propaganda feedback loop
(voters-media-politicians) will cater for the reward brought by identity confirmation. Members of
Congress and state representatives, particularly those from Bolsonaro’s former party, PSL (but
not the only ones), post professionally crafted political memes, marking them with their names,
pictures, social media handles and, at times, the logo of the media outlet the news comes from.
Noticeable is the logo or “signature” of conservative groups as well, such as “Conservative
Women from Ceará” (a Brazilian state), “Conservative Blacks”, organized social movements
such as “Move Forward Brasil”, or simply popular conservative social media influencers, some
of them running for municipal elections (one of them actually was elected in 2020). It turns out
that four out of the six people “signing” anti-China memes were students of Olavo de Carvalho,
according to a BBC Brasil report22. Table 1. illustrates who created or shared the internet meme.
Table 1 - Authorship of the analyzed memes
Authorship Number (out of 78)
Unknown 43
Memes by social media influencers 5
Memes by politicians 16
Memes by media outlet 8
Memes by social / organized  groups 6
Total 78
The second category is concerned with an objective nature, non-excludent, and tries to capture
visual (and verbal) references attributed to China, such as the Chinese flag, Chinese currency
(Yuan bills), Chinese military, Chinese president Xi Jinping, PCC (the acronym in Portuguese for
22 https://www.bbc.com/portuguese/brasil-46802265
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the Chinese Communist Party—CCP), references to communism (hammer and sickle, red star),
red color, as well as racist references (such as pulled eyes, changing the letter “R” for “L”,
“eating an ‘inappropriate’ animal”). Many memes show more than one reference in a meme.
Table 2. shows which references are made to China in the meme.
Table 2 - References to China




President Xi Jinping 34
Ambassador Yang Wanming 2
CCP 8





Only verbal reference to China or Xi Jinping 1
No visual or verbal reference to China 10
The third category is about how China’s action is represented in the memes. Table 3. shows what
China (or Xi Jinping) is doing. Some memes show more than one action. Considering that all of
these memes show China as the antagonist, it is important to see in which ways the conflict is
constructed:
● China is persecuting Christians;
● China has planned/created Covid-19;
● China is profiting from Covid-19;
● China controls/has bought Brazilian politicians;
● China controls/has bought Brazilian media;
● China controls Brazilian trade unions;
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● China controls international organizations
● China is applying/testing its vaccine in Brazil;
Table 3 - What is the act by China (or Xi Jinping) in the meme
China’s action N (out of 78)
Persecuting Christians 6
Planned/created Covid-19 7
Profiting from Covid-19 8
Controlling/buying Brazilian politicians 15
Buying Brazilian media 4
Controlling Brazilian trade unions 1
Controlling international organizations 2
Applying/testing its vaccine in Brazil 13
Following Cesarino’s (2019) research, it was expected that many of these memes would include
a binary “we” versus “them”, associating political opponents to the antagonist, China, as well as
ways to delegitimize opponents and press. In his extensive analysis of how Bolsonaro is
portrayed in memes, Chagas (2021) also found many examples with anti-democratic elements,
with negative references to the judiciary, the legislative, institutions, media, minorities, etc. As
many governors, the judiciary and parts of the legislative in Brazil are pushing for restriction
measures and getting vaccines from China, they are delegitimized for being associated “with the
enemy”. With all that in mind, the fourth category, illustrated on table 4., is about how
Bolsonaro’s political opponents are delegitimized in relation to China.
● Political opponents (executive/legislative/judiciary) are shown as children / dogs /
puppets;
● Political opponents are on Xi-Jinping’s lap / arms, or at his service;
● Political opponents are profiting from Covid (signs: $ or 100-yuan bills);
● Political opponents are helping China through the Covid-19 vaccine;
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● Political opponents are in a submissive position to receive a vaccine application or
examination by Xi Jinping;
● Political opponents are associated with repulse-inducing signs (rat, poison, biohazard,
blood)
Table 4. How Bolsonaro’s political opponents are associated with China
Representation of political opponents N (out of 78)
As children / dogs / puppet 5
In Xi-Jinping’s lap / arms, or at his service 10
Profiting from Covid 4
Helping China through Covid-19 vaccine 10
In a submissive position to receive a vaccine shot /
examination by Xi Jinping
2
Associated with repulse-inducing signs (rats, poison,
biohazard, blood)
4
Finally, based on the three strategic narratives about China found on Analysis A, I narrowed the
scope down to the ones that express partially or entirely at least one of the following narratives.
Since
1. “China is achieving hegemony through a health crisis (Covid-19)”;
2. “China is achieving hegemony through its economic power”
3. “China is achieving hegemony through its technology (5G network)”
Table 5 - Bolsonarist strategic narratives about China
Strategic Narrative N (out of 78)
1. “China is achieving hegemony through its economic
power”
9
1. “China is achieving hegemony through a health crisis
(Covid-19)”
17
2. “China is achieving hegemony through its technology 1
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(5G network)”.
I analyse the audiences’ “re-packaging” strategic narratives, hence my choice for memes as my
analysis material. From the perspective of everyday knowledge, the power of visual images
remains in their ability to crystallize and abstract meaning in an easily disseminated form. Visual
images are also a better way to appeal to emotions and emotive processing than are rational
arguments (Hakoköngäs 2020). These characteristics, in addition to the vividness of certain
images (e.g., photographs), can make visual communication rhetorically more powerful than
verbal or textual messages (Joffé, 2008).
Due to the limitations of this thesis, it was established that the analysis would comprise a
final selection of eight internet memes (~10%). The intention was to create a selection as
representative as possible, in order to see how different memes can express (a) strategic
narrative(s) with the most elements as possible. The selection of the final sample was done after
looking at all the 78 memes. Since nearly half (35 out of 78) of those memes were created or
shared by those in the propaganda feedback loop, I split the full sample by authorship, keeping in
mind that four of out of the ten selected for analysis would be from the feedback loop
(politicians, media outlet, social media influencers and organized social groups), with the
requirement that every category would be represented in one meme. The other four were chosen
from the group of unknown authorship. Once the representation was established (two groups of
four memes each), I populated each group with memes with the most elements from categories
#2 (references to China), #3 (what is China/Xi Jinping action) and #4 (how Bolsonaro’s political
opponents are associated with China). Then, through multimodal discourse analysis, I applied the
framework of strategic conspiracy narratives (Madisson & Ventsel 2020), guided by my second
research question: “How are Bolsonarist strategic narratives about China expressed in internet
memes?
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4. BOLSONARIST VIRTUAL MILITIAS FIRST ACT
AGAINST CHINA
What follows is a brief description of how the Bolsonarist media ecology operates, taking the
anti-China stance as an example. On 7 April, 2020, Olavo de Carvalho published on his
Facebook a post23 expressing his view on Brazil’s relationship with China:
“The situation is horrible and depressing, but it is not complex nor
difficult to understand. It can be summarized, without exaggeration, in the
following words: Brazil, as an independent nation does not exist anymore. It is a
Chinese protectorate, governed by an arrogant and intolerant ambassador who
has at his service the political class, the judiciary elite, the media, the education
system and a good part of the business community. The military class, conscious
of their total helplessness in face of the devastating power of this foreign
authority, turn a blind eye and try to save face. The nominal president cannot
count on any support except from the disperse, disarmed and destitute mass that
elected him and barely begins to become conscious that they have no power.
Brazil is defeated and will not rise up, except in the remote hypothesis that the
USA breaks the backbone of China’s power.”
With this message Carvalho joined the discussion surrounding the first diplomatic crisis between




Wednesday morning, 18 March, 2020. His message was a response to a thread posted by Rodrigo
da Silva, the journalist behind Spotniks, an online publication with an audience of more than 7
million people per month25. The original thread reads “The blame for the Coronavirus pandemic
in the world has a name and last name. It’s the Chinese Communist Party’s. And if you still have
any doubt about this matter, you need to read this thread”. Eduardo’s response use the reference
of a HBO show that had been aired a few months earlier in Brazil:
“Whoever watched Chernobyl will understand what happened. Substitute
the nuclear power plant with the coronavirus and the Soviet dictatorship with the
Chinese one. Once again a dictatorship preferred to hide something serious, over
exposing it resulting in weakening them, but which would have saved
numeriouslives. China is to blame and liberty would be the solution.”
The Chinese response came at 22:00, from different channels—the official diplomatic ones and
from Twitter by both the account of the Chinese Embassy in Brazil and from the Chinese
Ambassador, Yang Wanming. Besides reprimanding Eduardo’s “blatant anti-China attitude” and
warning of the “negative consequences”, messages from the Chinese Embassy account point out
the connections with the Trump administration: “Your words are extremely irresponsible and
sound familiar to us. They are nothing but an imitation of your dear friends [...] We advise you
not to rush to become America’s spokesperson in Brazil, under the risk of stumbling badly”26.
Although directed to Eduardo’s Twitter handle (@BolsonaroSP), it also mentioned the handles of
Minister Araújo, the Chamber of Deputies and the speaker of the Chamber, Congressman
Rodrigo Maia, who quickly apologized on behalf of the Brazilian people and of the Chamber of
Deputies.
On Thursday morning, Eduardo Bolsonaro doubled down and called the Bolsonarist








through the hashtag #ChineseVirus (#VírusChinês in Portuguese). The coordinated attack came
from the main Bolsonarist and Olavist spreaders27:
“An ambassador from a GENOCIDAL regime wants to violate the
Brazilian Constitution to stop a member of parliament from SAYING that the
#ChineseVirus is a chinese virus. Oh, FFS” (Allan dos Santos)
“The #ChineseVirus was a watershed in one aspect: it divided those who
have moral and humanitarian values from those who only care about amoral
value$. One can’t even begin to describe the amount of Chinese dictatorship
apologists coming out of the sewage” (Rodrigo Constantino)
“A country that until yesterday had a state policy to kill baby girls only
because they were women… Who are they to say anything? NOBODY. Shut up,
China. #ChineseVirus” (Bernardo Küster)
“China operates to implode democratic regimes #ChineseVirus” (Leandro
Ruschel)
Four hours before the Chinese response, the Directory of Analysis of Public Policies by the
Getulio Vargas Foundation started mapping the interactions surrounding the debate, which
generated 1,7 million tweets during the 42 hours analysed period28. As shown in the map of
interactions (image 1), Bolsonaro’s “virtual militia” attempted to promote attacks on China. The
nodal points in the blue section (Bolsonarist) show a massive and organized action by
Bolsonarist influencers, all of them Olavists. The nodal points in pic show a fragmented group,
without a strong discursive unity, but with a critical stance of Eduardo Bolsonaro, using satirical








(Image1 - Map of Interactions surrounding the debate between Eduardo Bolsonaro and China on Twitter.
Souce: DGV DAPP)
On March 20, two banners were placed outside the Chinese embassy in Brasília, insulting both
Chinese president Xi Jinping and Chinese ambassador to Brazil (image 2):
(Image 2 - banners placed outside the Chinese embassy on 20/03/20)
As the example illustrates, the Bolsonarist online communication and mobilization is extremely
effective, and for over a year now have been employed against China. The following chapters
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look into the narratives that make the audiences act and behave against what they consider as the
threatening “other”.
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5. BOLSONARIST STRATEGIC NARRATIVES
ABOUT CHINA
In this chapter I briefly go over the strategic narrative framework (Miskimmon et al. 2013) in
order to analyse (Olavist-)Bolsonarist strategic narratives about China, from publications and
statements by the three most influential policy makers in Brazilian foreign policy during Minister
Araújo’s mandate, which coincide with the first half of Jair Bolsonaro’s presidency.
From the material collected for this first level of analysis, the Olavist-Bolsonarist
strategic narratives about China are predominantly of the international system narrative,
describing the world, the main actors and where Brazil is situated, as well as the identity one,
describing the Asian nation in antithetical terms. Considering that these narratives are extracted
from statements by policy makers, the communication process here represents the formation. I
will focus on the five components and how they interact, resulting in three intertwined strategic
narratives.
5.1 The code-text of the “red menace” behind Bolsonarist
strategic narratives about China
As mentioned before, the ideological pulse of Bolsonarism comes from the teachings and
writings by Olavo de Carvalho, who has been influential in military circles since at least 1995
(Messenberg 2017) and is credited to be the “[...] ideological thinker of the Brazilian Far-Right”
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(Rocha 2021). His teachings are based on the premise that the communists are well articulated,
in control of international organizations and most institutions in Brazil, particularly surrounding
education, culture—to indoctrinate Brazilians in favor of communism—and foreign policy, to
connect Brazil to the international communist network. His reading of Gramsci is that Cultural
Marxism was successful in penetrating all spheres of Brazilian society.
However, the narrative of the Communist threat has been in the background or Brazilian
politics throughout the 20th century, de Carvalho was just good at dressing it in “Cultural
Marxism” clothes. It is no surprise that he found an audience among the retired generals and
commanders, he was even awarded with the Pacifier medal, the highest award from the Brazilian
Army. The Communists were the enemy during the military regime, particularly the domestic
ones, who are expressed in the figure of the internal enemy, who appear in moments of crisis in
Brazilian politics, like during the “New State”29 regime (1930-1945), headed by Getúlio Vargas,
and the military junta (1964-1985).
5.2 Strategic (Conspiracy?) Narratives by Ernesto Araújo
This subchapter is divided into three subchapters: 4.2.1 shows narratives by Araújo before he
was appointed Minister of Foreign Relations, which can be considered an international systems
narrative, which he constantly refers to as “globalism”. Subchapter 4.2.2 expands on his
narratives about China. Finally, subchapter 4.2.3 Concludes with the three strategic narratives
about China extracted from Araújo’s discourse.
5.2.1 Ernesto Araújo’s international systems narrative of Globalism
Araújo was the director of the Department of United States, Canada and Inter-American Affairs
when he published, in December 2017, the article Trump and the West. In it he analyzes two
29 Estado Novo - the regime of exception that went from 1930 to 1945, led by president Getúlio Vargas.
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speeches by former U.S. president Donald Trump, one given in Warsaw (06/07/2017) and the
other at the UN General Assembly (19/09/2017). At the center of his article/analysis, is the
theory of the clash of civilizations (Huntington 1993, 1997). According to Samuel Huntington,
conflicts in the future will be connected to culture or, more specifically, to religion. The fact that
Araújo was served in Washington D.C. between 2010 and 2015 could explain from where he got
the terms “Cultural Marxism” and “Globalism”, both borrowed from the American alt-right
(Cesarino 2019a: 540). Here already we can notice the basic dictionary that connects Araújo to
the followers and students of Olavo de Carvalho, who were back then already Bolsonaro’s
supporters and until this day make up the core of Bolsonarism.30 This basic dictionary is central
to the meaning-making strategies behind the Model Reader in Araújo’s writings.
In the “about me” section of his blog (Metapolitics - Against Globalism), he defines
globalism as “[...] the economic globalization that became steered by Cultural Marxism.
Essentially it is a anti-human and anti-Christian system. The faith in Christ means, today,
fighting against globalism, whose ultimate goal is to break the connection between God and man,
turning man into slave and God irrelevant. I want to help Brazil and the world to free themselves
from the globalist ideology.”31 Araújo’s self-description illustrates the Bolsonarist concentric
culture, which likely contributed to positioning him for the job as Bolsonaro’s minister. Araújo’s
article was published a year before he would be recommended by Olavo de Carvalho and
introduced to president Bolsonaro by his sons Eduardo and Filipe Martins32.
The focus of Trump and the West, for this thesis, is towards the end, where Araújo asks
the question: “What about Brazil? Is it a part of the West?” (Araújo 2017: 354). He dedicates one
page to the answer, which should illustrate some of his moves once he was in charge of Brazil’s
foreign policy. Araújo describes Brazilians as “[...] genuinely and deeply nationalistic people
[...]” and reminds the reader that Brazil is now seeking OECD membership. And then concludes:
“[...] in that vein, Brazil is part of the West - whether or not it wants to be - and whether or not it
feels so, this West is engaged in a colossal battle for its own survival”. Araújo then lays out that
Brazil needs “[...] to position itself on that stage, it cannot afford to see reality through the lens of
politics alone” (ibid). Here again it is possible to recognize, as part of a strategic narrative of





Brazilian refers to him/herself as “deeply nationalist”, chances are he/she is a Bolsonarist.
“Nationalist” and “Patriot” are common self-descriptions among Bolsonarists. As for the rest of
Brazilians, most of them only wave the national flag every four years, during the FIFA World
Cup.
In another post (Araújo 2018), published during the presidential elections, Araújo
presented a chain that started with Bolsonaro’s opponent and ended with China as the last stop
before hell. Interestingly, the chain of equivalences of the enemy, typical of populisms, was
described by another Ernesto (Laclau 2005), who was also included in Araújo’s chain: “Haddad
is Lula’s puppet. Lula is the puppet of Maduro, the current manager of the Bolivarian project.
Maduro is Chávez’s puppet. Chávez was the puppet of Laclau’s 21st century Socialism. Laclau
and every Marxism disguised as post-Marxism is the puppet of Maoism. Maoism is the puppet of
hell.”33 Here it is possible to recognize the rhetorical and stylistic hyper-encoding: the word in
Portuguese for puppet (títere) is not the word used by Araújo. Instead, his chain repeats the word
“poste” in every line. “Poste” literally means “light post”, a slang in Brazilian Portuguese for
someone who is placed as a façade for someone else who is actually doing the work from behind.
Bolsonaro and BolsonaristsAraújothe target group in mindAraújoreferred to Fernando Haddad in
this way, who replaced Lula as the candidate for the Workers Party less than a month before the
elections.
5.2.2 Araújo’s strategic narratives about China
REgarding two texts from before he was, at least technically, the person in charge of Brazil’s
foreign policy, it is already possible to understand Araújo’s modelling through the framework
presented by Madisson and Ventsel (2020). With the conflict against globalism as the topic,
based on a binary modelling of the world, and the Model Reader constructed, through the
ideological hypercoding anchored in nationalism and the rhetorical stylistic hyper-encoding




In Araújo’s inauguration as minister of foreign affairs, the model reader is Bolsonaro’s
electorate, and/or those following the teachings of “Professor Olavo de Carvalho, a man who,
after president Jair Bolsonaro, may be the greatest responsible for the immense transformation
that Brazil is living” (Araújo 2019). Araújo opens his speech with the versicle John 8:32, in
Greek, stating that it is “[...] a sentence that is absolutely fundamental to understand what is
happening in Brazil”. With this inference he determined the framework of action for the
participants in the narrative, brought up an intertextual scenario of not only religion but, again,
tapped into Bolsonaro’s rhetorical and stylistic hyper-encoding. Bolsonaro would cite John 8:32
at every opportunityAraújoduring the campaign to mobilize the Evangelicals (another big
segment of his electoral base), in his inaugurations, and during several of his speeches, including
the one at the United Nations General Assembly, in 2019. Once this framing is established, he
again brings up the topic of conflict, stating that “And ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall
make you free” (John 8:32) is “[...] that intimate and profound conviction that animated president
Jair Bolsonaro in the extraordinary battle that he fought and is fighting to reconquer Brazil and
return Brazil to Brazilians”.
He then lays out what Brazil’s foreign policy will be: “[...] we will fight to revert
globalism and push it back to its point of departure” (Araujo 2019). Considering that in Araújo’s
chain of equivalences of the enemy, globalism equals cultural marxism which equals Maoism.
Considering that Maoism is a Chinese version of communism, where else could Araújo push
globalism back to its point of departure? In Brazil, the main argument for having good relations
with China, at least throughout the last decade, was that China is Brazil’s top trade partner,
buying one third of Brazil exports. For Araújo, trade should not stop Brazil from defending its
values: “[...] one of globalism’s instruments, in order to muffle those that insurrect against it, is
to spread the notion that, in order to make trade and business, one cannot have ideas or defend
values. We will prove that that is completely false.” (ibid). In the Bolsonarist basic dictionary,
“values” is a rhetorical hyper-encoding that includes “[...] the family, the traditions, the love for
the country, love for God” (ibid).
And finally, speaking of Brazil’s action at the UN, Araújo advances that “[...] we will
defend freedom - freedom of expression, freedom of belief, freedom on the internet, political
freedom”. By laying out this framing, Araújo makes inferences of intertextual scenarios that tap
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into the previous reading experience by an important segment of Bolsonaro’s electorate: the
Evangelicals, for whom China persecutes Christians.
It is understandable that Araújo would not name China explicitly. China is the destiny of
40% of the exports in Brazil’s agribusiness (7 times more than the US)34, and the Parliamentary
Front of Farming and Livestock (FPA in Portuguese) has 257 members of Congress: 225
deputies (out of 513), representing 44% of the vote; in the senate, they hold 32 out of 81 seats.35
And they are the ones putting pressure from within the government on to the President to not
antagonize China.
When the dust from Eduardo Bolsonaro’s “Covid19 equals Chernobyl” tweet had settled,
Araújo published on his blog a review of “Pandemic! COVID-19 Shakes the World”, Slavoj
Žižek’s book (Žižek 2020)36. The title of his post is The Communavirus has arrived -
Coronavirus awakens us again to the communist nightmare (Araujo 2021). The article sketches
the discrete meaning of the pandemic within the non-discrete logic of the communist conspiracy.
For Araújo, Žižek “[...] reveals what Marxists have hid for 30 years: globalism substituted
socialism as the preparatory stage towards communism”. He cites and comments excerpts from
the book, and the lines between what Žižek wrote and what Araújo read become blurred. All in
all, the ideological hypercoding is shown throughout the article, like when Araújo claims that
Žižek’s book “[...] delivers without disguise the communist-globalist game of hijacking the
pandemic in order to subvert completely liberal democracy and market economy, enslave men
and transform them into automata deprived of spiritual dimension, easily controllable”.
Responding to Žižek’s claim that China’s systems of digital social control was better
equipped to face the pandemic, Araújo states: “With the pretext of the pandemic, the new
communism tries to build a world without nations, without liberty, without spirit, driven by a
central agency of ‘solidarity’, in charge of discipline and punishment. A state of permanent
global exception, transforming the world into a huge concentration camp”.
If that is the goal, the WHO is the tool: “[...] the value that WHO has at this moment to
the cause of denationalization, one of the prerequisites of communism [...]”. Moreover, the virus








itself is the tool: “[...]the virus appears, in fact, as a huge opportunity to accelerate the globalist
project”. The inferences of the ordinary scenario of the globalist conspiracy narrative draws on
the “Red Menace” code text of a communist over spectrum dominance.
In accordance with Bolsonaro’s repeated criticism of restrictive measures against the
pandemic, promoted by the WHO, Araújo draws on inferences of intertextual scenarios that mix
Wuhan in quarantine, WHO guidelines, and the future global communist world unleashed by the
coronavirus: “[...] Then, in a deserted city, without job, without life, where each person is a
prisoner in his/her cubicle, under the supervision of a supreme authority that is not even the
government of his/her own country (which, no matter how dictatorial it is, at least it has a face
and a flag), but an anonymous and unreachable global agency, there is the perfect configuration
of communist peace and emancipation”.
Finally, in his post An Itamaraty for Brazil’s freedom and greatness: management report
(Araújo, 2021), Araújo looks back at his work as minister: “I established the following principle:
if Brazil wants to be free and democratic, with an advanced capitalist economy founded in free
enterprise and private investment, and not in social control, not in a totalitarian organization, not
in statism, we need to place our relationship axis in the partnership with free and democratic
great nations”. Here he points out a binary modelling of the world, with inferences of two
ordinary scenarios (American system and Chinese system), with a framework of action: Brazil
has to choose between the two.
About the relationship with China, he adds: “I was guided by the following principle: the
fact of having a certain country as Brazil’s main trade partner, be it China or any other, does not
require, in any way, nor it justifies, that we offer this country the right to intervene in our
institutions, limit our freedom of expression in Brazil and other fundamental freedoms, or
determine our strategic decisions”. The inference scenario here is intertextual, by China’s “[...]
right to limit our freedom of expression[...] ”, he is pointing back to the first diplomatic crisis
caused by the “Chernobyl” tweet, when the Chinese ambassador demanded that Eduardo
Bolsonaro apologize to the Chinese people.
Araújo continues: “I was also guided by the observation, absolutely realistic, that China
today has ambitions of global expansion of its political and ideological influence through the
projection of its economic and technological power, realities which need to be taken into account
by a country like Brazil, whose political system differs entirely from the Chinese system. The
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important inference of scenario here is to the 5G technology (expressed in “technological
power”), a contentious topic by Bolsonaro’s administration, where the pragmatists agree on
letting China (mainly through Huawei company) enter the market, whereas the more ideological
wing of the government tries to find a loophole in the legislationAraújoand even considers a
presidential decreeAraújoto ban Huawei from the 5G network (the company is already present in
almost 50% of 4G network).37 The idea of banning Huawei from 5G networks in Brazil was
promoted by Eduardo Bolsonaro, again, on Twitter, on 23/11/2020, when he announced
Bolsonaro’s government support for the Clean Alliance Network, for “[...] a safe 5g network, free
of China’s espionage”. After strong condemnation by the Chinese embassy, for whom Eduardo’s
“totally unacceptable” words “[...] hinder Brazil’s image and undermine the friendly atmosphere
between the two countries”38. This was the second diplomatic crisis between Brazil and China
triggered by a tweet by Eduardo Bolsonaro, who deleted the tweet after the damage was already
done.
Anchoring on the non-discrete logic of code-textual meaning making, Araújo again draws
on the “Red Menace”: “I abandoned the idea - naïve and malicious - that a country’s
international performance and its internal socio-political structure are mutually indifferent. I
refused the perception, equally inadequate, that a country’s economic projection has nothing to
do with the projection of its political system”. Here the inference is once again related to the
scenario of the binary modelling of the world (American system and Chinese system), claiming
that by projecting its economy, China is projecting its political system.
5.2.3 Bolsonarist strategic narratives about China
From the analysis of Araújo’s discourse expressed in the five analysed texts, embedded








important policy makers: Eduardo Bolsonaro and Filipe Martins, both traditionalists. Araújo is a
traditionalist, praising Guénon and Évola in his Trump and the West article. In his book War for
Eternity: Inside Bannon's Far-Right Circle of Global Power Brokers, Teitelbaum (2020) says
that Araújo is more of a traditionalist than Olavo de Carvalho, and that “China represents
everything that the traditionalists reject - in their view, it is a massified, materialist and scientific
society, that dehumanizes people and is focused on economic aspects”. According to Teitelbaum,
traditionalism is at the base of the demonization of China and rapprochement with the United
States carried out by Brazil’s foreign policy. For his book, he interviewed Steve Bannon and
Olavo de Carvalho, who both praise Bolsonaro’s ideological wing (known as “Olavist” in Brazil)
for “[...] fighting to free Brazil from its mercantilist geopolitics, which ties the country to China
instead of prioritizing the spiritual roots that make Brazil part of the Judeo-Christian West”39.
During his mandate, Araújo was diplomatic in the sense of not overtly antagonizing China. But
his strategic narratives can be extracted from a reading of his discourse, particularly through an
analysis using the framework of strategic conspiracy narratives created by Madisson & Ventsel
(2020). The result of the analysis shows three Bolsonarist strategic narratives about China:
1. “China is achieving hegemony through its economic power”
2. “China is achieving hegemony through a health crisis (Covid-19)”;
3. “China is achieving hegemony through its technology (5G network)”
China plays a role in shaping both domestic and foreign policyAraújoantagonizing it serves the
purpose of mobilizing Bolsonaro’s base and, at the same time, serves as a token of
rapprochement with the United States, which since the Obama administration’s “Pivot to Asia”
strategy (2015) has been trying to rebalance China’s rise40. Bolsonaro benefitted from Trump’s
support, suffering a lot less international pressure as he does now that his ally is gone.








departures from the premise that “[...] we need China and China needs us a lot more”41, and that
“China needs Brazil in order to eat”42. Still as a deputy of Brazil’s lower chamber, but already as
a pre-candidate for elections, Bolsonaro visited Taiwan, in March 2018. China protested stating
that Congressman Bolsonaro’s visit was a violation of “[...] the principle of One China and that
not only confronts China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, but also causes potential
turbulences in the Global Strategic Partnership China-Brasil”43. These moves have not been
unnoticed by Americans, as former U.S. secretary of state, Mike Pompeo, a day before leaving
office, congratulated Bolsonaro for moving Brazil away from the BRICS44.
The next step is to see how these strategic narratives are expressed in anti-China memes.
44On 19/01/2021, Mike Pompeu twitted:  “Remember BRICS? Well, thanks to @jairbolsonaro and












6. Anti-China internet memes and how they project
strategic (conspiracy) narratives
This chapter shows the visual analysis of internet memes, using multimodal discourse analysis.
The next two subchapters will present four memes whose authorship is those in the feedback
loop, and four of unknown authorship. They will all be analysed using the framework of strategic
conspiracy narratives (Madisson & Ventsel 2020)
6.1. Memes with authorship by those in the feedback loop
The first set of memes show memes created and/or shared by those in the feedback loop:
politician (meme 1, image 3); organized social movement (meme 2, image 4); media outlet
(meme 3, image 5); digital influencer (meme 4, image 6).
6.1.1. Internet meme by a politician (Gil Diniz, state deputy in the São
Paulo state legislature)
The first meme example (image 6) was published by state deputy Gil Diniz, popularly known as
“reactionary mailman” (carteiro reaça). Like many other politicians in Brazil nowadays, they
publish professionally crafted memes that reproduce the news from media outlets in the
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propaganda feedback loop. Because they are “visually pleasant” and nicely put together (the
image, the story, the source), they receive a good amount of engagement: likes and shares. When
they are shared, the politician (and the media outlet, to a lesser extent) reach more people (more
potential audience for the media outlet, more potential votes for the politician.
CONTEXT: Gil Diniz was a mailman and was known by his colleagues as “the
reactionary mailman”, for being critical of the post’s trade union and of the Workers Party.
During the 2014 elections, he met Eduardo Bolsonaro, became friends, and helped him with
pamphlet distribution45. After Eduardo’s election, Diniz was hired as an aide in his cabinet, and
worked there until he was elected, in 2018, as deputy for the state of São Paulo, with 214.037
votes. He ran through the same party as Bolsonaro and Eduardo, the Social-Liberal Party, from
which he was expelled, in 2020, after being investigated for publishing desinformation and
attacks on the Supreme Court46. In fact, that investigation showed that all eight federal and state
deputies47 investigated published an average of two posts daily with attacks on the Supreme
Court, mostly based on false information. All of these 8 deputies make and publish
professionally crafted memes just like the one we see below. Diniz’s background represents well
the role of internet memes in Brazilian politics currently, especially among ]Bolsonaro’s former
party.
47 Federal deputies: (Party - State): Bia Kicis (PSL-DF), Carla Zambelli (PSL-SP), Daniel Silveira
(PSL-RJ), Filipe Barros (PSL-PR), Junio Amaral (PSL-MG) e Luiz Phillipe de Orleans e Bragança






(Image 3. Meme 1, by state deputy Gil Diniz)
ANALYSIS: Proceeding with the visual analysis, the positioning of the signs follow the order in
which the text (meme) should be read. The very first sign is the logo of the news source— Pleno
News, “a news site with conservative view”—communicating to the reader that the news
presented is sourced. Right at the top, centrally positioned, is the hammer and the sickle,
surrounded by big red flags, tapping into the basic diction and already presenting the ideological
hypercoding (communist) to the model reader. Following the reading top down, we see Xi
Jinping centrally positioned around the “communist” signs and in the middle of other Chinese
officials, functioning as inferences of an ordinary scenario that determine the framework that the
Chinese president is deliberating and making a decision, which is unanimously followed by those
around him - —and under him, as Xi Jinping is placed higher than the other officials. The text
reads “END OF THE THEORY. IN A SPEECH, CHINESE DICTATOR DEFENDS ‘NEW
WORLD ORDER’”. During the Boao Forum for Asia, Xi Jinping defended that
“[...]international matters must be treated by all through consultations”. Here we see the
meaning-making model based on the code text of the New World Order conspiracy theory,
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weaving a discrete unit (a speech stating what basically any leader would say in an international
forum) into the non-discrete logic of signification of the New World Order conspiracy theory.
Following the reading order, the reader finds a picture of Diniz, behind a microphone (he is the
one bringing the information to the reader) on the bottom left corner, the logos of the five
different channels where viewers can find him, on the bottom center, and, finally, the flag of the
state of São Paulo and his name.
6.1.2. Internet meme by an organized social movement (MOVE FORWARD
BRAZIL - AVANÇA BRASIL)
CONTEXT: The second example (image 7) is a meme created and shared by a social movement.
Self-described as “Brazil’s biggest conservative movement, Move Forward Brazil was founded on
15/02/2015 by ‘a group of free and conservative citizens of good morals, working towards Brazil’s
TRANSFORMATION into a LIBERAL STATE, with a prosperous, free and open society, permeated by




(Image 4. Meme 2, by organized social movement Move Forward Brazil)
ANALYSIS: The meme shows a picture of Xi Jinping and Bolsonaro. Considering the flags in the
background, it is very likely that this picture was taken at a bilateral meeting between Brazil and China.
Given its centrality in the picture, the first noticeable sign is the Brazilian flag, already triggering the
ideologic nationalistic hypercoding. Considering the Western order of reading a text, the next sign is Xi
Jinping, who is smiling, and then Bolsonaro, who is also smiling and giving the thumbs up while holding
hands with the Chinese president, as if they just made an agreement and both are happy about
it—Bolsonaro’s gesture shows that he is happier. With the inferences of an ordinary scenario of
“politicians controlled by China”, which supports, intertextually, the main narrative of Chinese global
control, the framing organizes the reader for the text: “URGENT: MINISTER OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS HAS DECIDED TO QUIT. IN THE PICTURE WE SEE THE PRESIDENT OF BRAZIL
NEXT TO HIM, JAIR BOLSONARO”. Considering that Ernesto Araújo was one of the most ideological
members of Bolsonaro’s cabinet, expressing positions (and projecting them internationally) that are at the
core of Bolsonarism, it is understandable that he would be very popular among the propaganda feedback
loop. Another instance of inference of intertextual scenarios: throughout the Bolsonarist semiosphere at
that time, news of China asking for Araújo’s head had been circulating for weeks. Rodrigo Constantino,
one of the main pundits of Bolsonarism in mainstream media, published, two months before Araújo
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stepped down: “If Ernesto Araújo is fired, Brazil ‘will soon become a Chinese province’”49. Finally, at the
bottom of the meme, to the left, the organized social movement’s social media handle and URL; and the
bank account link for PIX (a Brazilian form of wire transfer), with its QR code, showing how memes in
Brazil are even used for fundraising.
6.1.3. Internet meme by a media outlet (Bernardo Küster, director of Brazil
Without Fear / The Media Without Mask Brasil Sem Medo / Mídia Sem
Máscara).
CONTEXT: Bernardo Küster has a YouTube channel with over 924.000 subscribers. He is the
director of Brazil without Fear, “Brazil’s biggest conservative newspaper” and the director of
Olavo de Carvalho’s website. On 27/05/2020 he was a target of search and seizure by the Federal
Police under the investigation related to fake news, attacks and threats against =Supreme Court





(Image 5. Meme 3 - Bernardo Küster)
ANALYSIS: This meme (image 08) is in the top five among the entire corpus (78 total) with the most
signs. The reader’s attention goes right at Xi Jinping’s head, which is proportionally bigger than João
Dória’s (governor of the State of São Paulo and, for the first half of Bolsonaro’s mandate, his biggest
political opponent). The Chinese flag in the background shows yellow viruses instead of yellow stars. The
inferences of intertextual scenario refers to the agreement between Butantan (São Paulo state’s public
research institute) and CoronaVac to produce, in Brazil, the Chinese vaccine for Covid-19. Doria,
depicted as a jolly kid and holding a syringe with a green liquid (biohazard) with viruses, while Xi Jinping
is expressing a smirk and holding a bag of money, determine the framework that the São Paulo governor
was made a fool by China and will contaminate the citizens with the Chinese vaccine, which is packed
with viruses, making inference of another intertextual scenario: China created the virus in a lab. There are
two more rhetorical hyper-encodings: first, Xi Jinping is saying “MANDATOLY, RIGHT”, but with the
“R” in “Obrigatória” being replaced by an “L”, a racist way of referring to how Chinese people speak
Portuguese. Second, the rats around the politicians, the bag of money and the syringe, referring to a
common expression in Portuguese of calling dirty politicians “rats”. Finally, the discrete and non-discrete
logic of code-textual meaning making is combined with the ideological hypercoding, through the
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reference of “mandatory”, connecting the vaccination in São Paulo to the conspiracy of China’s dictatorial
government system being implemented through.
6.1.4. Meme by a digital influencer (Waoramos)
CONTEXT: Waoramos’ Twitter account was suspended for violating Twitter rules, but other
memes were found under that nickname, all of them with right-wing themes.
(Image 6. Meme 4 - Waoramos)
ANALYSIS: Compared to the previous memes, the one by Waoramos (image 09) already shows
a lot more simplicity, showing a crying “Wojak” and a dark-haired “Yes Chad”, two popular
meme templates put together, which could indicate that it could have been made by a simple
meme-maker app. Here the inference of intertextual scenarios is made within the meme genre, as
does the basic dictionary: those familiar with the meme genre already know which attitudes to
expect from the “characters”: crying Wojak infers “the loser”, whereas “Yes Chad” infers “the
arrogant”, “superior”. The ideological hypercoding strategy is actualized through the red color of
Wojak’s t-shirt with the hammer and the sickle in the middle, representing the Brazilian leftist,
whereas Chad is wearing a particular version of a “Lacoste” polo t-shirt, an expensive piece of
clothing in Brazil, hence representing Bolsonaro voter (the rich in Brazil’s biggest cities, are
where Bolsonaro won the majority of his votes). Another inference of two intertextual scenarios
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come from each characters’ speeche: Wojak says “You can’t blame China like that, you are being
xenophobic, your heart is pure hatred, you are a racist. It is our biggest trade partner, c’mon,
apologize now!”. To which Chad responds “THEY ATE BATS, SONS OF A BITCH.” Wojak’s
argument (expressed in lower case, inferring inferiority) taps into the common argument that
Bolsonaro (and those in his cabinet) should not antagonize China. Chad’s response uses the
rhetorical and stylistic hyper-encoding of insulting, trolling, and using ad-hominem attacks
which is constantly practiced and advocated by Olavo de Carvalho, another thing that he
imported from the alt-right. Finally, Chad’s response infers to the same urban legend Bolsonaro
referred to in the beginning of this thesis.
6.2. Memes by unknown authorship
The next set of memes consists of memes whose authorship is unknown. They look simpler but
still pack a good amount of signs and inferences, still allowing the reader to gather at least a sub
narrative. Keeping in mind Cesarino’s (2019a) research, it should come to no surprise that the
memes created by those immersed in the Bolsosphere are heavily influenced by what Laclau
(2005) referred as the axis of difference (drawing an antagonistic division between friend and
enemy). This antithetic identity creation is evident throughout these memes, associating domestic
opponents with a foreign enemy.
6.2.1. Meme 5 - “Judas Traitors”
ANALYSIS: The picture (Image 7, Meme 4) shows three governors, João Dória (São Paulo),
Wilson Witzel (Rio de Janeiro) and Ronaldo Caiado (Goiás). They are smiling. Juxtaposed to
their foreheads, emojis of money bags. So the first inference the reader makes is that the
governors are happy because they have money. By reading the text (left-right, top-bottom), it
starts with two words “Judas TRAITORS”, and ends with a big amount of 100-yuan bills. If the
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the model reader is an Evangelical, then the chain of inferences starts with the Christian
rhetorical hypercoding and a basic Evangelical dictionary: the three governors are traitors of the
worst kind, like Judas who betrayed Jesus for money, they betrayed Bolsonaro, since the
President is against restrictive measures to contain Covid-19, and these three governors imposed
them as infection rates skyrocketed in their states. Among the shops and activities they
suspended, they closed church services. If the model reader happens to be an anticommunist
Evangelical (a cross-section of two big Bolsonaro’s electorates), then another layer of ideological
hypercoding is added: they not only betrayed and got money for it, but were also marked by the
Beast (represented as Mao, the Chinese communist who persecutes Christians), as the money bag
emojis are placed right on their foreheads. If the Model Reader is an Evangelical, the process of
interpretation, guided by a binary modelling of the world, operates under two types of conflict,
with inferences of intertextual scenarios: Judas-Governors-China-Evil versus
Jesus-Bolsonaro-God-Good.
(Image 7. Meme 5 - “Judas Traitors”)
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6.2.2. Meme 6 - “Xi is the boss”
ANALYSIS: Another meme (Image 8 - Meme 6) that, by the look of it, was easy to put together,
but yet communicates an entire strategic narrative. The first noticeable sign is the Chinese flag,
then Xi Jinping raising his hand, mouth open, as if he were yelling. The verbal text says
something that could be closely translated as “I’m the boss of this fucking shit!!!”—with the last
two words showing “L” where it should be “R”, and an “í” where it should be “lh” (“porra”,
“caralho”). Only after reading the flag, Xi Jinping’s “yelling” and his words, can the reader pay
attention to the detail of the background: it’s the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies. The rhetorical
and stylistic hyper-encoding taps on the way to interpret Xi’s aggressive behaviour, but at the
same time mocks him because of the “L” instead of the “R”. The positioning of the Chinese flag
behind the tribune, and Xi’s posture as if he were in the Chamber of Deputies, infer to the
framework of action that he is indeed the boss, which, as many other memes show, a fourth
strategic narrative about China could be drawn: “China is in control of Brazilian
politicians/politics”
(Image 8.  Meme 6 - “Xi is the Boss”)
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6.2.3. Meme 7 - “Xi’s shot”
ANALYSIS: This meme (Image 9 - Meme 7) has a good balance of visual signs and verbal text.
On top it reads “IF THE POLITICIANS DIE, BRAZIL WILL BE SAFE!”. The populist
ideological hypercoding is set, with the rhetorical hyper-encoding that is common to many
Bolsonarists, who are anti-politics. Next, from top down, six heads of men representing all
Bolsonaro’s main opponents, with their pants down. From left to right: William Bonner, the
anchor of the most-watched news broadcast Jornal Nacional, aired every evening on Globo
channel, which Bolsonaro refers to “as the enemy”50. Next is Rodrigo Maia, president of the
Chamber of Deputies and also a political opponent. Then João Dória, governor of São Paulo and
one of Bolsonaro’s main opponents. The next one is Lula, former president and Bolsonaro’s
nemesis. Then, Gilmar Mendes, Supreme Court judge and also considered an enemy among
Bolsonarists. Finally, Rodrigo Pacheco, president of the Senate. Together these men represent the
media, the legislative branch, the political opponents from the Center and from the Left, and the
judiciary. Here the conflict as the topic is expressed, with all Bolsonaro’s “enemies” lined up to
receive a vaccine shot by “nurse” Xi Jinping, the international “enemy”, who is asking “WHO IS
GOING TO BE THE FIRST?”. Finally, written on Xi’s scrubs is CORONAVAC CHING-LING,
which brings up the stylistic hyper-encoding: “ching-ling” is a racist slang for cheap (almost
disposable) products made-in-China. All of the “politicians'' represented have called for
vaccination, which in Brazil is done mainly thanks to the China - São Paulo partnership,
producing in the state the Chinese vaccine with technology and components from China.
Coronavac represents more than 80% of the shots given in the country. Bolsonaro has mocked






(Image 9.  Meme 7 - “Xi’s shot”)
6.2.4. Meme 8 - “Chinese deal”
ANALYSIS: This meme (Image 10 - Meme 8) looks cute, but it’s packed with racism, conflict,
intertextual scenarios and conspiracy theory. It is titled “Chinese man humor” and requires from
the reader to relate to the rhetorical and stylistic hyper-encoding, with again switching “R” for
“L”, as well as inferences of intertextual scenarios of sub narratives. The story told goes as
follows: “I spread a virus to the whole world. I brought down the world’s economy, including
Trump’s. I made friends in Brazil. Globo. Dória. I sold everything overpriced, ventilators, masks.
Now I am also going to sell the vaccine overpriced as well. I profit and Brazilians fight with
Bolsonaro. Chinese deal. Thank you Brasil!” The expression “Chinese deal” (“Negócio da
China”) is an expression in Portuguese that means “a very advantageous (trade) agreement”,
tracing back to the time when European merchants would make fortunes selling Chinese and
other Asian goods.
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(Image 10.  Meme 8 - “Chinese deal”)
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7. CONCLUSION
This thesis applied a semiotic approach to analyze Bolsonarist strategic narratives about China
and how they are reflected on internet memes. I described Bolsonarism using concepts from the
Tartu-Moscow School of semiotics of culture. First, its development is shown through the model
of the semiosphere, where a key spreader, Olavo de Carvalho, who was a peripheral writer and
commentator in Brazil, did boundary work and translation after gaining contact with the
American alt-right. Alongside conspiracy theories and trolling, internet memes have increasingly
expanded their role as a media of political communication.
Considering that Bolsonaro’s foreign policy has an antagonistic stance towards China,
which is reflected in the constant provocations made by the Olavist members of his cabinet, I set
out to research the Bolsonarist strategic narratives about China, guided by my first research
question. My empirical material was discourses and writings by the most Olavist of all, Minister
Ernesto Araújo. Since Araújo projects a self-description of someone who lives to free Brazil and
the world from Globalism, I found pertinent to apply the framework of strategic conspiracy
narratives for the analysis of his texts. I analyzed Araújo’s discourse and extracted three strategic
narratives out of it: in short “China is seeking hegemony through 1) its economic power, 2) its
technology (5G) and 3) the pandemic.
Parallely, I collected anti-China memes and analysed 8 of them, guided by my second
research question: how are Bolsonarist strategic narratives about China expressed in internet
memes? The findings show that strategic narratives can easily be expressed in internet memes,
applying the framework conceptualized by Madisson and Ventsel. Also important was the
reference of Bolsonarism as digital populism, especially knowing what guides the creation of
online content by those immersed in the Bolsonarist semiotic space. As Cesarino described,
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drawing a division friend-enemy is central in the meaning-making and production of online
content, thus by analysing the memes, I found a forth strategic (conspiracy) narrative: “China is
bringing Brazil under its global hegemony through the control (mainly by economic power but
also through its vaccine) of domestic elements, namely politicians, the media, and organized
society.
Another important finding is how central the propaganda feedback loop is in
Bolsonarism. In a very short period, an entire media ecology has evolved, offering identity
confirmation (sometimes over facts) to a considerable segment of the Brazilian population, who
is encouraged by the populist politicians not to consume mainstream media show how
“conservative” media outlets promote “conservative politicians” while both feed the
audience/voter with more identity confirmation. In this culture, memes have attained a level of
sophistication to the point that they are even used for fundraising.
A framework combining concepts such as propaganda feedback loop, conspiracy
cascades, strategic conspiracy narratives and, Cesarino’s science of digital populism appears to
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bolsonarolikud strateegilised narratiivid hiinavastastes meemides
Magistritöö “bolsonarolik kommunikatsioon – bolsonarolikud strateegilised narratiivid
hiinavastastes meemides” tegeleb kahe uurimisküsimusega:
Mis iseloomustab Hiina kohta käivad bolsonarolikke strateegilisi narratiive?
Kuidas väljenduvad Hiina kohta käivad bolsonarolikud strateegilised narratiivid
internetimeemides?
Teoreetiline raamistik ühendab endas Tartu-Moskva koolkonna kultuurisemiootika (eeskätt
Lotmanilt ja Uspenskilt), strateegiliste narratiivide teooria (lähtudes semiootilisest lähenemisest,
milleks on strateegiliste vandenõunarratiivide teooria) ja Brasiilia digitaalse paremäärmusliku
populismi, ehk bolsonarismi, mida on käesolevalt mõistetud kui näidet kontsentrilisest kultuurist.
Analüüs koosneb kahest osast: esiteks on kajastatud bolsonarolikke Hiina kohta käivaid
strateegilisi narratiive, analüüsides selleks Brasiilia välisminister Ernesto Araújo’ga seotud
diskursust, kasutades selleks strateegilistele vandenõunarratiividele rakendatud
kultuurisemiootikat, keskendudes eelkõige mõistetele, nagu Mudellugeja, Mudelautor, konflikt
teema ja koodtekst. Uurimistööst selgus, et bolsonarolikud hiinakohased strateegilised narratiivid
ulatuvad tagasi „Punase hirmu“ vandenõuteooriani, mis oli Brasiilias esil terve 20. saj vältel ning
leidis sealses poliitikas olulisematel võimukeskme muutumise hetkedel strateegilist kasutamist.
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Hiina - ehk kommunism - on bolsonarismi vaatepunktist „võõras“ ning väljendab konflikti, mis
on tõlgendatud narratiivi teemana ja mida kasutatakse riigisisese toetuspõhja loomiseks, sest
bolsonaristide identiteet luuakse läbi vastanditel põhineva tähendusloome. Välispoliitika osas
võimaldab hiina vaenlasena kujutamine lähendada end Ameerika Ühendriikidele, seda eriti ajal,
mil ametis oli Trump. Hiinat mainitakse harva selgesõnaliselt, kuid diskursiivne strateegia on
sellegipoolest Mudellugeja suhtes edukas, kasutades järeldusi, retoorilist hüperkodeerimist ning
ideoloogilist hüperkodeerimist.
Analüüsi teine osa viidi läbi 8 Hiinavastase internetimeemiga (valitud 78 meemiga korpusest),
kasutades selleks multimodaalset diskursuseanalüüsi. Seejuures rakendati algusest peale sama
lähenemist ja lisaks ka propaganda tagasisideringi termineid ning “digitaalse populismi viit
reeglit” (pärit Cesarinolt), mis juhivad bolsonaristide veebivõrgustikes sisuloomet. Tulemustest
selgub, et Hiina kohta käivad strateegilised narratiivid leiavad meemides kajastamist viisil,
millega kaasneb sõbra ja vaenlase binaarne vastandamine, vaenlasega seotud ohu õhkkonna
loomine ning olulisemate siseriiklike poliitiliste vastaste Hiinaga seostamine. Meemid võivad ka
kujutada vaid osakest lugeja poolt loodavast tervikust. Selle, mis pole öeldud, võib lugeja
Mudellugeja diskursiivsete strateegiate kaudu “dekodeerida”. Seejuures tuli osades meemides
esile ka bolsonarismiga seotud propaganda tagasisidering, kus poliitikud-meedia
asjatundjad-valijad/vaatlejad omavahel vahetuvad ning neid premeerib enda identiteeti
kinnitamise jagamine, mis on mõnikord ka faktidest olulisem.
Tulemused on aluseks edasisele uurimistööle, kus üks võimalik uurimissuund oleks memeetiline
sõjapidamine, et näha, kuidas kuvatakse narratiiviga seotud meeme rahvusvahelisele
auditooriumile. Paljud uurimistöös leitud meemidest olid seotud Covid-19 pandeemia ja Hiina
vaktsiiniga, teine uurimissuund võiks keskenduda analüüsile, mis selgitaks, kuidas kasutatakse
meeme vaktsiinidega seotud rahvusvahelises teabesõjas.
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